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The United Kingdom is a signatory of a number of inter-
national treaties protecting various aspects of human
rights, including freedom from discrimination. Yet, there
is no legislation in this country protecting a comprehen-
sive list of human rights in the manner of the United
States Bill of Rights, although there have been a number of
unsuccessful attempts to enact such legislation since 1969.
Moreover, prior to the race relations legislation there
was no general rule, policy or principle in common law
directly relevant to combating racial discrimination or
incitement to racial hatred.
In specific situations, however, as a by-product of
the regulation of other areas, the common law and various
statutes (e.g. the Public Order Act 1936)1 did--and do--
make unlawful certain conduct and the use of speech which
might incite racial hatred. They also provide an indirect
remedy to one who can prove discrimination.
*This article first appeared in The Open University,
Race Relations and the Law, Block 2, Unit 7 of "Ethnic
Minorities and Community Relations: A Third Level Course" (E
354) @ 1983 The Open University Press.
**Fellow and Tutor in Law, Lincoln College; Oxford Uni-
versity, LL.B. 1974, Queen's University, Belfast; LL.M. 1975,
Yale University; M.A. 1980, Oxford University; D. Phil. 1981
Oxford University. Mr. McCrudden is also a faculty member of
the Oxford University Institute on International and Compara-
tive Law; advisor to the Northern Ireland Equal Opportunities
Commission, the Employment Equality Agency, and editor of the
Weidenfeld & Nicolson "Law in Context" Series. In addition,
he is the author of numerous publications concerning discrimi-
nation law and human rights in the United Kingdom.
1. Public Order Act, 1936, ch. 6.
The inadequacies of the common law and statutes stimu-
lated several unsuccessful initiatives during the 1950s and
early 1960s to secure legislation directly designed to com-
bat racial discrimination and render incitement to racial
hatred unlawful. The Labour Party, going from a position
of neutrality to one of support by 1964, gradually accepted
the principle of legislation, a decision which Katz-
nelson 2 attributes in part to the effect of the Notting
Hill and Nottingham "race riots" in the summer of 1958.
The resurgence of neo-Nazism in the early 1960s also con-
tributed, particularly to the law relating to incitement to
racial hatred.
This article shall examine the development and current
operation of the law in two areas connected with race:
incitement to racial hatred and unlawful discrimination.
II. THE OFFENCE OF "INCITEMENT TO RACIAL HATRED"
The Race Relations Act 19653 (1965 Act) attempted to
deal with the public order problems of racial incitement in
two ways. Firstly, the Public Order Act 1936 was to be
extended to make it illegal to publish threatening and
insulting material with intent to provoke a breach of the
peace. Secondly, incitement to racial hatred itself was
also made unlawful by Section 6(1) of the 1965 Act, which
stated:
A person shall be guilty of an offence under this
section if, with intent to stir up hatred against
any section of the public in Great Britain distin-
guished by colour, race or ethnic or national
origins--
2. I. Katznelson, Black Men, White Cities 129 (1973).
3. Race Relations Act, 1965, ch. 73.
(a) he publishes or distributes written matter
which is threatening, abusive or insulting; or
(b) he uses in any public place or at any public
meeting words which are threatening, abusive or
insulting, being matter or words likely to stir up
hatred against that section on grounds of colour,
race or ethnic or national origins.
4
When introducing the measure to the House of Commons,
the Home Secretary explained that the clause was "designed
to deal with more dangerous, persistent and insidious forms
of propaganda campaigns--the campaign which, over a period
of time engenders the hate which begets violence".5
Prosecutions could only be by or with the consent of
the Attorney-General. Few prosecutions in fact occurred
under the 1965 Act. Lord Scarman described Section 6(1) in
his report on the Red Lion Square disorders as an "embar-
rassment to the police" and "useless to a policeman on the
street". 6 Macdonald also assessed the operation of the
provision as "hardly a success". He pointed out that apart
from Colin Jordan, a well known British National Socialist,
the only persons convicted under the 1965 Act between 1965
and 1976 were black.
7
In 1975, after numerous calls for its revision, the
Government reviewed the 1965 Act's provisions and concluded
that changes were necessary:
During the past decade, probably largely as a
result of Section 6, there has been a decided
change in the style of racialist propaganda. It
tends to be less blatantly bigoted, to disclaim
any intention of stirring up racial hatred, and to
purport to make a contribution to public education
and debate. Whilst this shift away from crudely
racialist propaganda and abuse is welcome, it is
not an unmixed benefit. The more apparently
rational and moderate is the message, the greater
4. Id.
5. 711 Parl. Deb., H.C. (5th ser.) 941 (1965).
6. Scarman, Lord, Report on the Red Lion Scare,
Cmnd. No. 5919 (1974).
7. I. Macdonald, Race Relations: the New Law 138
(1977).
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is its probable impact on public opinion. But it
is not justifiable in a democratic society to
interfere with freedom of expression except where
it is necessary to do so for the prevention of dis-
order or for the protection of other basic free-
doms. The present law penalises crude verbal
attacks if and only if it is established that they
have been made with the deliberate intention of
causing groups to be hated because of their racial
origins. In the Government's view this is too
narrow an approach ... It therefore proposes to
ensure that it will no longer be necessary to
prove a subjective intention to stir up racial
hatred.
Section 70 of the 1976 Race Relations Act 9 (1976
Act) put this policy into effect by amending Section 6 of
the 1965 Act and inserting the provision in the Public
Order Act 1936. It is no longer necessary to prove that a
person intended to stir up racial hatred. If his or her
words or actions are "likely" to stir up hatred in fact,
then an offence has occurred. Any prosecution must still
be by or with the consent of the Attorney-General.
The incitement to racial hatred provision is one of
the few criminal law provisions remaining in the present
race relations legislation. The criminal law rather than
the civil law is invoked because such incitement is
regarded as an offence to public order. However,
the actual occurrence of public disorder is not a necessary
component of the offence of incitement to racial hatred.
The gist of the offence "is the opprobrious nature of the
words or conduct in question and the feelings of disgust
they are liable to arouse.." I0 Between 1977 (when the
new section became effective) and April 1980, nine of the
fifteen people prosecuted for incitement to racial hatred
or conspiracy to incite racial hatred, or both, were found
8. Home Office, Racial Discrimination, Cmnd. No. 6234
(1975).
9. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74.
10. S.A. deSmith, Constitutional and Administrative
Law 478 (3d ed. 1977).
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guilty. Sentences passed by the courts included four
months' imprisonment in one case and nine months' imprison-
ment in another.
11
Section 70 of the 1976 Act and its enforcement have
been subject to a number of criticisms. On the one hand,
it has been argued that the section goes too far; the
removal of a requirement of intention to incite racial
hatred is "contrary to the fundamental principles of
British justice." 1 2 Furthermore, "[a]n increase in the
rate of successful prosecutions might create the impression
among the public that the sensibilities of ethnic minori-
ties were being protected in a manner not extended to other
groups in society.
" 13
On the other hand, it has been argued that the section
is not sufficiently comprehensive, since it does not give
the police a power of summary arrest, and it requires the
Attorney-General's consent for prosecutions. So, limiting
prosecutions, it has been claimed, precludes proceedings
other than with respect to the most blatant offences.
1 4
The Government has replied that the law might fall into
disrepute, and that harm might occur to race relations if
private prosecutions were allowed which, although doomed to
fail, nevertheless give additional publicity to defendants
by providing the opportunity to restate their views in
court. 15
11. Home Office, Review of the Public Order Act 1936
and Related Legislation, Cmnd. No. 7891 (1980).
12. Id.
13. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, Fifth
Report, The Law Relating to Public Order, HC 756-I
(1979-80).
14. Id.
15. United Kingdom, Sixth Periodic Report to the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 11,
U.N. Doc. CERD/C/66/Add. 13 (1980).
Section 70 of the 1976 Act mirrors the 1965 Act in that
it does not penalize "the dissemination of ideas based on an
assumption of racial superiority or inferiority or facts
(whether true or false) which may encourage racial prejudice
or discrimination."1 6 Other countries have outlawed racist
propaganda of this type. Indeed, Article 4 of the Inter-
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,1 7 which is in force and which has been
ratified by the United Kingdom, requires States, among other
things, to:
... declare an offence punishable by law all dis-
semination of ideas based on racial superiority or
hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as
well as all acts of violence or incitement to such
acts against any race or group of persons of
another colour or ethnic origin, and also the
provision of any assistance to racist activities,
including the financing thereof; [and to]
... declare illegal and prohibit organizations,
and also organized and all other propaganda
activities, which promote and incite racial dis-
crimination, and ... recognize participation in
such organizations or activities as an offence
punishable by law.18
Using standards like these, organizations in this
country have sought a wider scope for the British legisla-
tion. The Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), for
example, has proposed to the Home Affairs Committee
(Committee) a new definition of incitement to racial hatred.
This would make unlawful the uttering at a public meeting or
the publishing of words which, having regard to all the cir-
cumstances, expose any racial group in Great Britain to
hatred, ridicule or contempt. The CRE's aim was to remove
16. Supra, note 7.
17. International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature March
7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (ratified by the United Kingdom
with reservations, March 7, 1969, 677 U.N.T.S. 435).
18. 660 U.N.T.S. at 220.
the need to evaluate the subjective reactions of readers or
audience; an objective test would be left to the jury. The
Committee rejected the proposal.
19
Extending the 1965 Act to include similar proposals was
considered in 1975 but the White Paper of that year
announced:
The Government is not at this stage putting for-
ward proposals to extend the criminal law to deal
with the dissemination of racialist propaganda in
the absence of a likelihood that group hatred will
be stirred up by it ... It is arguable that false
and evil publications of this kind may well be
more effectively defeated by public education and
debate than by prosecution and that in practice
the criminal law would be ineffective to deal with
such material. Due regard must also of course be
paid to allowing the free expression of opinion. 20
A Home Office Green Paper in 1980 also stressed the
effect of such a proposal on freedom of expression:
It would make no allowance for genuine discussion
and debate or for academic consideration of such
proposals. To single out political proposals for
proscriptions by law regardless of how they are
expressed, and in what circumstances, and of the
possible consequences would be a new departure.
In the Government's view such a departure would be
totally inconsistent with a democratic society in
which--provided the manner of expression, and the
circumstances, do not provoke unacceptable conse-
quences--political proposals, however odious and
undesirable, can be freely advocated.2 1
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION
A. The Race Relations Act 1965
On April 7, 1965, the Race Relations Bill was
formally introduced in the House of Commons by the Labour
Government. In addition to those provisions considered
above concerning incitement to racial hatred, the Bill
19. Supra, note 13.
20. Supra, note 8.
21. Supra, note 11.
proposed to make discrimination in hotels, public houses,
restaurants, theatres, cinemas, public transport and any
place maintained by a public authority a criminal offence
punishable by fines of up to £100. Prosecutions were only
to be undertaken with the authority of the Director of
Public Prosecutions. Discrimination in employment and
housing was not to be made unlawful. Restrictions by
property sellers on the disposal of tenancies to particular
racial groups, were made unenforceable.
Considerable pressure, however, was put on the
Government to change the method of enforcement. In a
particularly influential paper, Jowell, 22 for example,
argued against criminal sanctions on four grounds:
(a) Such legislation did not contain the
machinery to eliminate discrimination except so
far as would-be offenders are deterred by the fear
of criminal sanction;
(b) It was difficult to persuade the prosecution
to take action;
(c) It was difficult to prove a case beyond
reasonable doubt; and
(d) Cases might come before a jury which was not
sympathetic with the objectives of the law.
Jowell also argued against the traditional type of
civil enforcement. This would not be effective, he
argued, again, for at least four reasons:
(a) Aggrieved persons are unwilling to indulge in
the expense or effort of instituting civil
actions;
(b) A person who discriminated might be prepared
to pay damages in civil cases or a fine in a
criminal suit as the price for continuing to
discriminate;
(c) An immediate public hearing could exacerbate
existing racial friction;
(d) "The opportunity of giving evidence to a
civil or criminal court could be enjoyed by those
with little other opportunity of obtaining an
audience for the demonstration of their racial
prejudices or obsessions." 23
22. J. Jowell, Administrative Enforcement of Laws
Against Discrimination; Public Law 119-86 (1965).
23. Id. at 167.
Based on North American experience, a number of groups
argued for a system of enforcement through a specially con-
stituted administrative body as an alternative to the
criminal or civil process. Such enforcement would empha-
size the elimination of discrimination for the public
interest, rather than for purposes of revenge on or punish-
ment of the individual discriminator. The administrative
body could also be given powers which would make it more
effective than the ordinary civil and criminal processes.
As a result of pressures inside and outside Parlia-
ment, significant changes were made in the Bill's anti-dis-
crimination provisions before it became law. The Govern-
ment substituted a form of administrative enforcement pro-
cedure. Criminal sanctions were dropped in cases of dis-
crimination and retained only for racial incitement. A
specialized agency, the Race Relations Board (Board), was
charged with enforcing the legislation. The Board set up
local conciliation committees to investigate complaints
from those who considered themselves victims of discrimina-
tion. If attempts to settle complaints failed, the local
conciliation committees reported to the Board. If, in turn,
the Board found that there had been discrimination and
considered it likely that the discrimination would continue,
it could refer the case to the Attorney-General. The
Attorney-General could then seek an injunction in court
requiring the discrimination to cease.
Although a conciliation committee could investigate a
single instance of discrimination, it could take no action
unless it found that the discrimination formed "part of a
course of conduct." 24 Neither the Board nor the local com-
mittees had the power to summon witnesses, subpoena docu-
ments, require answers to questions or issue orders.
According to Lord Stoneham, a government spokesman, concilia-
tion was included "to avoid bringing the flavor of crimi-
nality into the delicate question of race relations"
2 5
rather than to improve enforcement. Throughout the debates,
the government stressed its desire to actively prevent litiga-
tion from ever arising under the Bill.
B. The Race Relations Act 1968
Between 1965 and 1968, a number of pressure groups (and
the Board itself) mounted another well-organized campaign to
extend and strengthen the anti-discrimination (as opposed
to the incitement to racial hatred) provisions of the 1965
Act. 26 The campaign stressed that a new Act must pro-
hibit discrimination in housing and employment. It drew
support from the influential and well publicized Political
and Economic Planning 27 report, which found that racial
discrimination in these and other areas varied in extent
but was generally substantial. It was argued that the weak
enforcement structure of the 1965 Act should give way to
one closer to the American agency enforcement model advo-
cated by Jowell.
A new Race Relations Act was passed in 1968 (1968
Act),28 prohibiting discrimination in both public and
24. 716 Parl. Deb. H.C. (5th ser.) 982 (1965).
25. 268 Parl. Deb., H.L. (5th ser.) 1006 (1965).
26. See A. Lester & G. Bindman, Race and the Law
(1972).
27. Political and Economic Planning (PEP), Report on
Racial Discrimination (1967).
28. Race Relations Act, 1967, ch. 71.
private employment and housing, subject to certain excep-
tions. The 1968 Act retained the two-tier enforcement
mechanism of the Board plus local conciliation committees.
Upon receipt of a complaint, the Board first determined
whether it had jurisdiction and whether there had in fact
been discrimination. It then tried to conciliate in the
dispute. If this failed, the Board itself was given the
power to bring a case against the discriminator in one of a
number of specially designated county courts in which "race
relations assessors" sat with the judge trying race
relations cases.
Individuals could not take discrimination cases di-
rectly to the county courts under the Act; that was solely
the responsibility of the Board. The Board was also given
an additional power to initiate investigations without such
individual complaints. This power was limited, however, by
the requirement that the Board suspect discrimination
against a particular person. "Discrimination" was defined
as "less favourable treatment on the ground of race, colour
or ethnic or national origin." This in turn was inter-
preted as requiring proof of a discriminatory intention on
the part of the person under investigation.
A different procedure controlled the settling of com-
plaints of employment discrimination. Prior to 1967, the
Confederation of British Industry (CBI) and the Trades
Union Congress (TUC) opposed legislation prohibiting
discrimination in employment on the ground that it con-
flicted with the British tradition of "voluntarism" in
industrial relations. In this context,
[Voluntarism] refers to our preference for collec-
tive bargaining to state regulation as a method of
settling wages and other terms and conditions of
employment. Secondly, it expresses a preference
for our own voluntary or non-legalistic type of
collective bargaining. Thirdly, it is identified
with- the preference of the bargaining parties for
complete autonomy in their relations.2 9
The CBI and the TUC finally agreed to the inclusion
of employment in the Act, provided that internal disputes
procedures be exhausted first. The procedure adopted in
the 1968 Act required that any complaints of employment dis-
crimination be initially dealt with not by the Board as
were all other types of complaint, but by the Department of
Employment (the Department). If suitable voluntary machin-
ery to deal with the complaint existed within the industry
concerned, the Department would send it back to that "in-
dustry machinery". Only if none existed, or if the com-
plainant was appealing from a decision of the particular
industry machinery, did the Board have any jurisdiction to
hear the complaint. Only at this juncture, too, could the
courts be involved. The use of industry machinery was thus
a compromise between the industrial relations value of
voluntarism and the need for government intervention in
cases where the parties themselves were unable to solve the
problem.
In practice, the coverage and enforcement provisions
of the 1968 Act were deficient. Discrimination, as defined
by the 1968 Act, was difficult to prove. The 1968 Act did
not apply to the present effects of past discrimination or
to unintentional discrimination. In most cases the Board
could do little until it received a complaint; therefore
it was unable to conduct a systematic campaign against dis-
criminatory practices.
29. A. Flanders, Management and Unions 174 (2nd ed.
1975).
The Board's limited powers to investigate when no com-
plaint had been received were small compensation. Investi-
gations were further handicapped because the Board had no
power to require production of relevant evidence. More-
over, the two-tiered structure -- conciliation committee
decisions followed by the Board review -- increased the
time spent on investigation, and provoked bitter contro-
versies between Board and committees. The hope that the
special enforcement provisions for employment complaints
would stimulate the growth of voluntary procedures was not
borne out; existing industry machinery proved cumbersome
and of questionable value to both industry and race rela-
tions. Even where discrimination was proven, the remedies
available to the Board, and more particularly to the
courts, were extremely limited.
Another important influence in the late sixties
leading to a new Act in 1976 was the campaign for legisla-
tive intervention to help secure greater economic equality
between the sexes. In 1970, an Equal Pay Bill was intro-
duced and passed by Parliament. It became fully effective
at the end of 1975. In September 1974, the White Paper,
Equality for Women, 30 detailed the Government's further
proposals for limiting sex discrimination. The proposals
covered not only employment and training, but also educa-
tion, housing, and the provision of goods, facilities and
services. The White Paper also announced the Government's
aim to "harmonize the powers and procedures for dealing
with sex and race discrimination so as to secure genuine
equality of opportunity in both fields. 31 The White
Paper justified this proposed harmonization:
30. Home Office, Equality For Women, Cmd. No. 5724
(1974).
31. Id. (emphasis added).
The nature and consequences of racial and sex dis-
crimination are not, of course, identical. But
they share important common features: the adverse
treatment of someone on grounds irrelevant to that
person's intrinsic qualities and qualifications;
the morally unacceptable and socially harmful
nature of such conduct; and the pressures of
prejudice, custom and conformity which encourage
discrimination on either ground. The objectives
of the law are also essentially similar in both
fields: to eliminate anti-social practices; to
provide remedies for the victim of unfair discrimi-
nation; and indirectly to change the prejudiced
attitudes expressed to discrimination.
3 2
Harmonization raised two interconnected questions.
Firstly, should the procedures, coverage and enforcement
provisions of the two acts be identical? Secondly, if they
should, then should a single agency with powers to deal
with race and sex discrimination be established?
The Government decided that harmonization should not
go so far as to include a single enforcement agency at that
time, but that strong arguments favoured adopting, almost
in their entirety, the coverage and enforcement details of
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975. 33 This proposal had
several practical advantages. Firstly, it increased public
understanding of the two Acts' operation. Secondly, it
allowed both enforcement agencies to work on similar lines.
Finally, it might also have the political advantage of
easing passage of race relations legislation, since Parlia-
ment would already have approved virtually identical
enforcement provisions in the Sex Discrimination Act 1975.
In September 1975, the White Paper Racial Discrimina-
tion, 34 was issued, proposing that coverage and enforce-
ment provisions almost identical to those in the Sex
Discrimination Act 1975 should be enacted to deal with
racial discrimination.
32. Id.
33. Sex Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 65.
34. Supra, note 8.
C. Race Relations Act 1976
The scope of the Race Relations Act 197635 (1976
Act) is, like its predecessors, subject to several impor-
tant restrictions. There is an exception for all clubs
whose main object is to benefit members of a particular
race or ethnic or national origin, but not of a particular
colour. With regard to employment, there is a limited
exception where being of a particular racial group is a
"genuine occupational qualification" for a particular job.
The Act does not apply to employment within a private
household. An employer may also discriminate in, or in con-
nection with, employment on a ship, if the person applied
or was engaged for that employment outside Great Britain.
With respect to housing, there is a limited exception for
owner-occupiers; the leasing of small premises is also
excluded. More generally, exceptions exist for acts done
under statutory authority (such as immigration legislation)
and for acts to safeguard national security.
In other respects, however, the 1976 Act is broader in
scope than the 1968 Act. It makes discrimination on
grounds of nationality unlawful, in addition to discrimi-
nation on grounds of race, colour, and ethnic and national
origins. It is unlawful for non-profit-making associations
(including private clubs) having over twenty-five members
to discriminate on these grounds in the admission of people
to membership or in the treatment of members or associate
members. In certain circumstances, it is unlawful to
victimize a person for alleging discrimination under the
Act.
35. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74.
Most importantly, perhaps, the 1976 Act brought to
British law a considerably broadened concept of equality of
opportunity between the races. In particular, the meaning
of discrimination was expanded to cover "indirect discrimi-
nation" as well as the "direct discrimination" prohibited
by both the 1968 and the 1976 Acts. In addition, the 1976
Act permits, though it does not require, a form of "posi-
tive" or "reverse" discrimination for the first time. The
next section examines these provisions more closely.
IV. THE MEANING OF EQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY IN THE
LEGISLATION
A. Indirect Discrimination
The interpretation of discrimination adopted by the
1968 Act was too limited for two main reasons. Firstly, it
was difficult to establish that discrimination had occurred
because proof was required of a person's discriminatory
intention. Secondly, legislation against discrimination
as defined in these terms did nothing to prevent the use of
criteria which had the effect of excluding dispropor-
tionate numbers of minority groups, irrespective of inten-
tion. For example, the 1968 Act made it unlawful for an
employer to consider race when a black worker sought a job
in a factory. However, the 1968 Act ignored the fact that
a black was less likely than a white to be hired for rea-
sons other than those directly connected to race. That is,
there would be a greater chance that a black would be
deficient in those attributes which make an applicant
successful. This could be due to the present effects of
past discrimination, immigrant disadvantage, or
"institutional discrimination" (i.e., the unjustified use
of criteria having an exclusionary effect even though exclu-
sion may not be the intention).
Such criticisms led to demands for the replacement of
the 1968 Act's non-discrimination principle by what I shall
call the principle of "fair equality of opportunity". This
requires that individuals with the same degree of talent
and ability, and the same willingness to use them have the
same prospects of success regardless of their initial place
in the social system, that is, irrespective of the income
group, class, or racial group into which they happen to
have been born.
The 1976 Act took account of these criticisms of the
1968 Act by expanding the meaning of discrimination to
include not only "direct" but also "indirect"
discrimination:
A person discriminates against another in any cir-
cumstances relevant for the purposes of any pro-
vision of the Act if ... he applies to that other a
requirement or condition which he applies or would
apply equally to persons not of the same racial
group as that other but--
(i) which is such that the proportion of persons of
the same racial group as that other who can comply
with it is considerably smaller than the proportion
of persons not of that racial group who can comply
with it; and
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irres-
pective of the colour, race, nationality or ethnic
or national origins of the person to whom it is
applied; and
(iii) which is to the detriment of the other
because he cannot comply with it. 36
Thus, a person alleging indirect discrimination has to
prove three elements. Consider an employment situation.
Firstly, does the employer have a requirement which he
applies to both his Pakistani and English workers? (For
example, does he require passing a language proficiency
test before workers can be considered for promotion?)
36. Race Relations Act, 1976, Section i(i).
Secondly, if so, is this requirement such that the
proportion of Pakistanis who are able to comply with it is
considerably smaller than the proportion of English workers
who are able to comply with it? (In our example, do con-
siderably fewer Pakistani workers pass the language pro-
ficiency test than English workers?) Thirdly, is the person
actually alleging discrimination unable to comply with the
requirement--the need to prove "detriment"? (In our
example, is the person who is complaining of discrimination
himself unable to pass the test?)
If the person alleging discrimination has been able to
establish the three elements, then the employer (or whoever
is the alleged discriminator) must show that the require-
ment is justifiable. If the employer does not, then
indirect discrimination has been proven. The courts have
interpreted "justifiability" in a variety of ways. Their
future approach is uncertain--will an interpretation
develop which is interventionist, or will a much less
taxing and intrusive interpretation with greater deference
to managerial concern be applied?
Although most racial discrimination cases under the
1976 Act involve allegations of direct discrimination,
complaints of indirect discrimination are increasing. In
1980-81, for example, allegations of indirect discrimina-
tion in employment rose to 20.5 per cent of all racial dis-
crimination cases in employment compared with 7.7 per cent
in 1979-80. 37 As a result of the adoption of the
37. Department of Employment, Employment Gazette,
1978 through 1981.
indirect discrimination provision in the 1976 Act, some
firms have become more aware of the extent of the problem
of unintentional discrimination and have adopted equal
opportunity programs in an attempt to deal with it. In
general, however, the 1976 Act appears to have had little
effect on institutional discrimination.
3 8
B. Beyond Anti-discrimination
The 1976 Act explicitly permits a limited measure of
positive (or reverse) discrimination in favour of minority
groups in the form of exceptions to the general prohibition
of discrimination. Section 35 of the 1976 Act contains a
general exception for conduct intended to meet the special
needs of particular racial groups in regards to education,
training, welfare or ancillary benefits:
It permits access to facilities, services or bene-
fits to be restricted, or to be allocated first,
to members of the particular racial group in ques-
tion provided it can be shown that members of that
racial group have a special need in regard to
their education, training, welfare or ancillary
benefits, which is met by such a restriction or
preferential allocation.3 9
In addition, employers, training bodies, trade unions
and employers' organizations may, though they need not,
operate a system of "positive action". For example, if a
racial group has been under-represented in an occupation
within twelve months prior to commencement of a training
program, then the training body may lawfully discriminate
by limiting access to training for such work to that racial
group, or take steps to encourage members of that racial
38. C. McCrudden, Institutional Discrimination,
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 366 (1982).
39. Home Office, Racial Discrimination: A Guide to
the Race Relations Act 1976, 30, 1977.
group to take advantage of opportunities for doing that
work.
Employers may take similar action under similar condi-
tions, taking into account the population of the area from
which the employer normally recruits. In addition, if
appropriate conditions are fulfilled, trade unions and
employers' organizations may lawfully encourage members of
a particular racial group to take advantage of opportuni-
ties to hold posts in the organization or afford members of
that racial group access to training facilities which will
prepare them to hold such posts.
The 1976 Act, however, does not generally make it law-
ful "for the employer to discriminate at the point of selec-
tion for such work" 40 or for organizations to discrimi-
nate "in admitting people to membership or in appointing
members to posts in the organizations".41 At least some
of the problems which have arisen in the United States
related to determining the permissible limits of reverse
discrimination have been pre-empted in Britain by reason of
these detailed provisions. This degree of detail in the
1976 Act has at least two effects. On the one hand, it pro-
vides to employers and unions clearer guidance as to what
is permissible and perhaps thereby encourages those who
might have hesitated to step into the unknown. On the
other hand, its rigidity may prevent the type of fruitful
experimentation which has so advanced the sophistication
and sensitivity of American programmes. Given the lack of
pressure in Britain to embark on even the most basic
programmes, this rigidity may not have much restrictive
effect.
40. Id. at 31.
41. Id.
In Britain, fair equality of opportunity, rather than
equality of results, is the major (and, except in very
limited circumstances, the only) objective. Although the
form of positive discrimination which allows a job to be
given to a member of a minority group is generally unlawful,
in one circumstance it is permitted--where being of a
particular racial group is a "genuine occupational
qualification". This includes the situation where part of
the job is to provide persons of a particular racial group
personal services promoting their welfare, and those services
can most effectively be provided by a person of that racial
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group.
V. ENFORCEMENT OF THE RACE RELATIONS ACT 1976
The methods of enforcement of the 1976 Act are also sub-
stantially different from those of the 1968 Act. Indi-
viduals may now take their cases directly to the county
courts or industrial tribunals; they need not first process
them through a Race Relations Board or an equivalent
administrative body. Non-employment complaints are heard
in county courts in which race relations assessors sit with
the judge. Employment discrimination cases go to
industrial tribunals rather than to these county courts.
Before a case reaches a tribunal, there is an opportunity
for a statutory body, the Advisory, Conciliation and
Arbitration Service (ACAS)43 , to attempt to conciliate
the dispute. Both the industrial tribunals and the county
courts are given increased powers to remedy proven
discrimination.
42. Race Relations Act, 1976, ch. 74, Section 5(2)(d).
43. Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service,
Annual Report, 1978.
A different procedure for enforcing the general duty
of non-discrimination in the public sector of education has
been introduced. Here, the only sanction is action by the
Minister responsible. Most allegations of discrimination
against specific pupils of a school or applicants for
admission, however, can be contested in the modified county
courts.
A new enforcement body, the Commission for Racial
Equality (CRE), was set up in 1977. The CRE replaces both
the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations
Commission and enjoys considerably greater powers of
investigation. Rather than being largely reactive to
individual complaints, like the Board, the CRE can initiate
strategic investigations without the need for complaints by
aggrieved individuals. The CRE can investigate even when
it does not suspect discrimination against a specific
individual. In addition, the CRE has the power to grant
assistance to individuals who wish to commence proceedings
under the 1976 Act.
Two factors should be borne in mind when considering
the anti-discrimination provisions of the 1976 Act.
Firstly, the law "on the books" may not be an accurate
reflection of what happens in day-to-day affairs, since
government ministers, CRE commissioners, judges, and
industrial tribunal members all operate or interpret the
law with a degree of discretion. Secondly, the use of the
law to achieve social change in such areas as racial
discrimination is comparatively new in Britain, and the
British tend to be far more skeptical than the Americans
that social change can come about through the legal
process. 44 Clearly, both of these factors could influ-
ence the operation of the legislation. Therefore, it is
important to examine briefly some examples of the actual
enforcement of the 1976 Act, up to the end of 1981.
A. Discrimination Cases Taken to Courts and Tribunals by
Individuals
The vast majority of cases alleging racial discrimina-
tion taken to courts and tribunals under the 1976 Act
involve discrimination in employment rather than in educa-
tion, housing, goods, facilities, services or other areas.
Between June 1977 and December 1981, individuals put for-
ward 1440 racial discrimination complaints relating to
employment. In the July 1980 to June 1981 period, three
types of complaint predominated: dismissal (50.9 per
cent); refusal to engage or to offer employment (21.4 per
cent); and lack of promotion (7.5 per cent). Most allega-
tions were of direct discrimination and came predominantly
from manual occupations, although the proportion of com-
plaints from managerial and professional occupations rose
significantly after 1977. 4
Even taking test cases into account, it is apparent
that few cases of racial discrimination reach courts and
tribunals compared with the magnitude of discrimination
suggested by social science evidence. Reasons advanced
46
to explain this situation include:
44. See C. McCrudden, Anti-discrimination goals and
the legal process, reprinted in, Ethnic Pluralism & Public
Policy (N. Glazer & K. Young, eds. 1983).
45. Supra, note 37.
46. Commission For Racial Equality, Annual Report for
1979, 5 (1980).
1. A fear of victimization;
2. The failure of the person discriminated
against to realize that discrimination has
taken place;
3. The lack of knowledge of the implications of
the legislation, especially where indirect
discrimination is concerned;
4. The perception of the difficulty of proving
a case;
5. The prospect of protracted and complicated
litigation;
6. Trade union preference for using other
methods, for example, bargaining;
7. The lack of trade union support within the
workplace;
8. Perceptions that job retention is more important
in a period of economic decline than job equality;
9. The extent of job segregation preventing
comparisons.
An important element in employment discrimination
cases is the availability of independent conciliation
machinery. After an individual has made a complaint to a
tribunal under the 1976 Act (and sometimes even before such
a complaint, if requested) an officer of the ACAS may
attempt to conciliate. One effect of the activities of
the ACAS and of private conciliation settlements is that
few applications to the industrial tribunals actually
result in a tribunal decision; most are settled before the
hearing. Of the 1268 applications to tribunals between
June 1977 and June 1981, only 494 cases actually reached a
tribunal. Table 1 indicates the nature of the settlements
in 1980-81: TABLE 1
Settlement of racial discrimination applications to
industrial tribunals, 1980-81
male female all percentage
Cases cleared without a
tribunal hearing:
conciliated settlement 53 9 62 18.8
withdrawn by appli-
cant 102 29 131 39.7
Tribunal decisions 107 30 132 41.5
TOTAL 262 68 330 100.0
These include cases in which the parties reached a
private settlement and cases in which the applicant with-
drew upon a showing the discrimination was outside the
scope of the Act.
Source: Department of Employment, 1981.
Proving direct or indirect discrimination is extremely
difficult, particularly in cases before industrial tri-
bunals. 47 The three main obstacles, which apply to
non-employment as well as to employment cases, appear to be
the absence of statistical and other necessary information;
the decentralized nature of much of the decision-making
under investigation; and the interlocking roles of the many
individuals and institutions involved therein. Therefore,
it is often hard to allocate responsibility with sufficient
clarity to warrant a finding of discrimination by any
particular individual or institution.
In order to offset the difficulties of proof of dis-
crimination and the reluctance of individuals to litigate,
the CRE is empowered to grant legal and procedural assist-
ance, when appropriate, to individuals wishing to invoke
the 1976 Act. In 1981, the CRE received 864 formal
requests for assistance, the majority of which related to
employment discrimination. In 118 cases, the CRE offered
legal representation, in a further 160, extensive advice
and assistance, and in 214, initial advice and assistance.
In only 110 cases did the CRE provide no assistance at
all. 48 The evidence available tends to show a high
correlation between representation by the CRE in both
industrial tribunal and court cases, and success of the
plaintiff represented.
49
47. Supra, note 37. Between 1977 and 1981, of the
494 applications heard by tribunals, only 102 (20.7 per cent)
were successful.
48. Commission For Racial Equality, Annual Report for
1981, 9-10 (1982).
49. See K. Menon, Individual Complaints and the
Industrial Tribunals, A Review of the Race Relations Act
1976 (1979).
B. Remedying Discrimination: County Courts and Industrial
Tribunals
When a county court upholds a complaint, the remedies
available are those which the High Court can award in non-
criminal (or tort) cases, including monetary compensation
(damages) and an injunction. When an industrial tribunal
upholds a complaint of unlawful employment discrimination it
also has a number of remedies available: an order declaring
the parties' rights respecting the alleged act; damages,
including compensation for injured feelings; and a recommenda-
tion that the discriminator take specific action within a
specified period to right the wrong done to the complainant.
For example, the tribunal can recommend that the victim be
reinstated or be offered the next available vacancy. Between
June 1977 and June 1981, orders declaring rights were made in
five cases; compensation (usually less than £400) was
awarded in forty-eight cases; and recommendations were issued
in fifty-three cases. Recommendations are not enforceable,
however. If the respondent fails to comply, additional mone-
tary compensation may be awarded.
These remedies suffer from a number of limitations.
Firstly, damages cannot be awarded for indirect discrimina-
tion if the respondent shows it was not intentional; there
is therefore little incentive for an individual to allege
indirect discrimination. Secondly, an individual must show
that any discrimination was detrimental to him or her.
Thus, a claim that an act is discriminatory will not be
successful unless the claimant is personally disadvantaged
by the act, making it difficult, for example, to litigate a
series of discriminatory practices by one institution or
association. Thirdly, recommendations can only effect a
reduction or obviation of the adverse effect of the act of
discrimination on the complainant. Wide-ranging
affirmative-action court orders of the American type thus
cannot issue. Only the CRE may apply to a county court for
an injunction, and no injunction may be granted by an
industrial tribunal. Mandatory injunctions are not
available.
C. Agency Enforcement: the Commission For Racial Equality
The CRE's main functions are to:
1. Conduct investigations in areas covered by the
Race Relations Act 1976 and take action to
eliminate unlawful discrimination;
2. Promote equality of opportunity and good
relations between different racial groups;
3. Assist and represent individual complainants
in appropriate cases;
4. Keep the operation of the legislation under
review and make recommendations;
5. Conduct research and take action to educate
and persuade public opinion;
6. Draw up a Code of Practice in the employment
area.
These functions can be divided into two groups. The
second and fifth concern promotional and educational work
(which includes funding and supervising the local community
relations councils). The first, third, and fourth concern
law enforcement activities. The sixth--drafting a Code of
Practice--might bridge these two groups of functions, but
has yet to be successful. The CRE, after the lengthy con-
sultative processes laid down by the 1976 Act and after
detailed discussions, has submitted a draft Code to the
Secretary of State for Employment. As of August, 1982, how-
ever, there had been no definite response.
Constant debate has centered about the proper balance
between the CRE's promotional and law enforcement activi-
ties. For example, in its 1981 investigation of the CRE,
the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee (Committee)
argued that the CRE's role should be largely restricted to
that of a law enforcement agency. The Committee further
argued that the CRE'S work on the promotion of equality of
opportunity and good race relations should be:
solely dictated by the need to eradicate racial
discrimination ... The Commission's priority
should be the undertaking of promotional work
which builds on the firm foundation of the prac-
tical experience won through detailed investiga-
tion and research. The further promotional work
is removed from being an adjunct of law enforce-
ment the less effective it becomes ... By rushing
ahead with promotional work unrelated to law
enforcement, the Commission have [sic] put an
unwieldy cart before an admittedly ponderous
horse; it is now time for the Commission to
concentrate on the horse catching up with and
leading the cart.50
The CRE and the Government replied that this would con-
fine the CRE's role too narrowly:
Not only must the Commission undertake the law
enforcement duties imposed by the Race Relations
Act; it also needs to play an effective part in
the wider field of combating racial disadvantage,
in contributing to the general climate of opinion
on racial issues and in educating people for a
multi-racial society.51
Nonetheless, the Government did accept the Committee's
general criticisms of the present effectiveness and balance
of the CRE's work. Furthermore, the CRE is currently
reviewing the relationship between its promotional and
investigation work "in order to align the two more
closely". 52
50. House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, First
Report, Commission For Racial Equality, HC 46-I (1981-82).
51. Home Office, The Government Reply to the First
Report from the Home Affairs Committee, Commission For
Racial Equality, Cmnd. No. 8547, at 4 (1982).
52. Id.
The CRE may conduct formal investigations for any pur-
pose connected with its statutory duties. These duties
include not only working towards the elimination of discrim-
ination but also the promotion of equal opportunity and
good race relations. By the end of 1981, the CRE had
initiated forty-seven investigations, one of which had been
discontinued, while thirty-four were still in progress;
twenty-four of the thirty-four involved employment.
5 3
The Director of the Equal Opportunity Division of the CRE
has detailed the reasons for this emphasis on employment:
Employment is obviously of crucial importance, and
the widespread extent of discrimination in employ-
ment has been well substantiated by PEP research.
Moreover, because of the way in which it is organ-
ized, employment is particularly susceptible to
investigation: indeed the whole argument for the
need for investigative powers was originally formu-
lated in the context of employment.5 4
VI. CONCLUSION
In selecting subjects for investigation, the CRE has
concentrated on the most important industries and services
in geographical areas with strong ethnic minority repre-
sentation. It has also tried to cover a wide range, both
geographically and in types of employment, so that its
investigations may have the widest possible repercussions.
The CRE had, by the end of 1981, published reports in
twelve of the investigations completed. Eleven of these
investigations resulted in non-discrimination notices. In
addition, non-discrimination notices have been issued in
six of the thirty-four investigations in progress.5 5 The
53. Supra note 46, at 7.
54. P. Saunders, The Strategic Use of the Law, A
Review of the Race Relations Act 1976, 65 (1979).
55. Supra note 46, at 7.
results so far have been disappointing. Most of the
published investigations have been small, and the Home
Affairs Select Committee has criticized the CRE for its
delays in completing some of its larger ones. The CRE,
while admitting that there is room for improvement, has
replied that major investigations inevitably take a long
time, since they are in effect major research exercises
conducted within the context of law enforcement. The CRE
has also indicated that the procedures laid down by the Act
are too cumbersome, that there is considerable scope for
respondents to delay inquiries, that the CRE's resources
are inadequate, and that the difficulty of proving
discrimination is considerable. Whatever the reasons, the
CRE's formal investigations have at this point obviously
made little impact on levels of discrimination.
In the future, some of the more important investiga-
tions may be expected to result in non-discrimination
notices. The CR,'s powers once discrimination has been
found shall therefore be examined. A non-discrimination
notice, which can apply for up to five years, may require
the respondent not to discriminate any further. When such
compliance involves changes in practices or other arrange-
ments, the respondent may be required to inform the CRE
that he or she has effected the changes and to take reason-
able steps to communicate that information to other persons-
concerned. A non-discrimination notice may also require
the discriminator to provide the CRE with sufficient infor-
mation to show compliance with the terms of the notice.
There are, however, considerable limitations on the
CRE's remedial powers. Firstly, it is unclear to what
extent the statutory provisions permit the CRE to impose
positive, mandatory requirements. Secondly, where the CRE
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has reasonable cause to believe that someone does not
intend to comply with a requirement contained in a
non-discrimination notice, the CRE may only apply to a
county court for an order requiring compliance. This is
not an injunction, however, and non-compliance is not
contempt; it is only punishable by a small fine.
